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Words and their meanings: Principles of variation and stabilization 
Stéphane ROBERT 




This chapter, entrenched in cognitive linguistics, proposes a 
multidimensional approach to the layering of the lexicon and its 
semantic organization, explicating the principles of variation and 
stabilization of lexical networks. Semantic variation is considered as 
inherent to language structure and driven by common universal 
cognitive mechanisms which are accounted for by a dynamic 
conception of meaning construal. Intra-linguistic plasticity of meaning 
echoes inter-linguistic variation. The discourse level is the seat of 
meaning construal mechanisms which contribute to the general 
polysemy of lexical units and to the stabilization of their meaning 
within a particular utterance. Units appear to be the seat of most 
variations, within and across languages, because meaning is construed 
in extremely varied ways according to common mechanisms. 
 
Keywords : meaning, polysemy, discourse, comprehension 
Introduction1 
For both structural and cognitive reasons, natural languages are 
characterized by their plasticity, by the ease with which the representations 
borne by the units composing them are subject to change. Polysemy and 
polyreference are the general rule among languages. A single unit can thus 
have several different meanings and point to several different referents. In 
English for example the word greens can refer to village commons, leafy 
vegetables or members of a political party. Inversely, different units can 
refer to the same thing, such as roe and caviar, or hepatitis and jaundice. 
One could even state that local synonymy (limited to a certain context) is 
what makes it possible to paraphrase a term or phrase using another. Thus 
reflect can be paraphrased by either “think” or “throw back light”. The 
ability to build equivalences is in fact a fundamental property of language: 
equivalences between terms (synonymy) or between phrases (paraphrasing), 
                                                 
1 Our deep thanks go to Margaret Dunham for her precious help in translating and 
accomodating this paper to English. 
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but also between languages (translation). There is no one-to-one relation 
between form and meaning, either within a language or across languages. 
From this view point, variation within languages (polysemy, synonymy), 
echoes variation from language to language and raises the question of how it 
is possible to say “the same thing” differently.  
 
Whereas this plasticity in meaning ensures both the referential power of a 
language and a form of optimization for the system, it also entails another of 
language’s defining characteristics - ambiguity and its communicative 
corollary: misunderstandings. That communication remains nonetheless 
possible is because the factors of variation in language are submitted to 
processes of regulation and meaning stabilization. I will begin by attempting 
to highlight a certain number of variation factors at the level of the isolated 
units, then I will try to show that in language activity, virtual units undergo 
certain operations whereby they are incorporated into utterances, and to 
highlight this different operations of the sentence level, which permit a 
certain stabilization in meaning but also occasion communicative failures. 
We will take this opportunity to also question the causes of these language 
characteristics and possible consequences from a cognitive viewpoint. For 
language is the seat of tensions between opposing forces which can all be 
functionally justified. 
1. Language malleability and variation at the unit level 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning in 
language: a form almost always has several meanings which vary according 
to context, and several forms can refer to a same item. This plasticity 
constitutes one of language’s fundamental principals. It is made manifest in 
different ways but follows consistent procedures. Units appear to be the seat 
of the most variation, within and across languages, not only because 
meaning is construed in extremely varied ways (categorizing and 
segmenting the world, selecting properties and reference pathways, cf. 1.1.), 
and because linguistic units are subjected to regular meaning changes (cf. 
1.2.), but also because words contain what I have called a “depth 
dimension” (see below 1.3.), also extremely variable. Units thus show 
variable specificities depending on the language and on the culture, which 
most probably plays an important role in cognition’s access to reference. 
We will limit ourselves here to lexical units, but grammatical units also 
undergo regulated variation. 
1.1. Different means of reference accessing (on synonymy) 
Linguistic reference is always mediated. Firstly because words are not 
things, they are substitutes for the reality they designate (independently of 
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the nature of the reality), or more precisely they are the representatives of 
representations (Culioli, 1990: 22). However, this reality does not constitute 
a pre-segmented, stable, given, for which words would be but the labels. 
Indeed, reality is presented to perception as a continuum, whereas language 
is composed of discrete units. Therefore it must segment the perceived or 
conceived reality, in order to build the referential values of its units, and this 
segmentation varies from language to language. Although traces of iconicity 
in language exist (i.e. resemblances between form and meaning), generally 
speaking, the relation between a form and its referent is arbitrary, which 
also contributes to inter-linguistic variation. This arbitrary character is 
moreover what makes languages so powerful: if words necessarily 
resembled the objects they designated, languages, which make sparing use 
of phonetic means, would be extremely limited. Thus the signifier (the 
form), is variable, and applies to meanings which vary from language to 
language.  
1.1.1. Variable categorization, segmentation and construals 
To illustrate the variable segmentation carried out by languages, I will take 
examples from two domains which could a priori appear as the most 
constrained by physical and perceptive data, and thus the most stable: body 
parts and spatial reference. Despite the fact that the data is shared, the body 
is “segmented” into different referential units depending on the language. 
The word leg in English designates, following the referential scale2, either 
the whole of the lower member, or the part below the knee, whereas in 
Wolof, tànk, in its wider sense, refers to the part below the knee, and in its 
narrower sense, to the foot. Thus the segmentation differs between the two 
languages. Some languages contain terms which refer to body parts that do 
not exist in other languages, so the body cannot be considered a specific 
language unit. Contrary to French and English, Ibo (a Kwa language spoken 
in Nigeria) and Langi (a Bantu language spoken in Tanzania) do not 
lexically differentiate arm from hand. Moreover, language can view body 
parts in relation to each other or in relation to outside elements in various 
ways. Mandarin Chinese establishes a link between the terms leg, thigh and 
foot, as there is a common term for the three: tuǐ. But Chinese can also 
specify whether the “leg” is a “small tuǐ”, xiǎo tuǐ, or to refer to the thigh as 
“big tuǐ”, dà tuǐ. Contrary to English, French establishes a link between the 
“fingers of the foot” doigts de pied, and the “fingers of the hand” doigts de 
la main (on body parts, see Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm’s article, in this 
volume and Brown 2005a and 2005b). Sanskrit uses the same term, 
pradeśinī, to refer to the forefinger or the corresponding toe. Thus our body, 
which is the same for everyone physically speaking, is not conceived of in 
the same way by all languages. Furthermore, these differences in 
                                                 
2 On scale of predication, see Langacker (1991b: 283). 
To appear (2008), in Martine Vanhove (ed), From polysemy to semantic change: towards a 
typology of lexical semantic associations, Typological Studies in Language, Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins: 55-92.  
 
VERSION NON CORRIGEE 
 
segmentation affect the grammar. Certain African languages for example 
classify objects according to whether they occur in pairs (hands, eyes, 
feet...), and these objects are grouped into one category (“class”), with a 
specific grammatical agreement. In many languages, the fact that body parts 
are inalienable possessions triggers specific syntactic constructions. Thus in 
French one says je lave ma voiture (lit. « I am washing my car”) but je me 
lave les mains (lit. “I am washing me/myself the hands”). Spanish includes 
clothing in constructions for inalienable objects, contrary to French.  
 
Concerning spatial orientation, languages show three major reference 
systems: an absolute reference system, like the cardinal points; an 
anthropomorphic reference system such as right and left which are defined 
with respect to the observer, and a relative (or intrinsic) reference system 
which takes one object as a reference point for locating another (“on the 
roof”, “near the house”...). Languages generally use all three systems but 
apply them along varying scales. Thus in French, to situate a building, one 
tends to use the relative/intrinsic referential system (“the post office is on 
the corner” or “beside the town hall”) whereas in the US one tends more to 
use absolute references (“it is north of the campus”), which French usually 
reserves for a larger scale, to locate one city in reference to another 
(“Amiens is north of Paris”). One could be tempted to think that these 
reference systems are universal, but such is not the case. Some languages, 
such as Malagasy and most Austronesian languages, use only one system, 
namely absolute reference, independently of scale. In these languages, one 
never says “the book is on your right”, but “the book is to the north (or 
south) of the table” (cf. Ozanne-Rivierre 1999). Lastly, the cardinal point 
system is also variable: some American Indian languages have not four 
cardinal points but six, as they also include the zenith and the nadir as 
spatial references. Thus, even though the physical properties of the world 
allow one to make certain predictions as to linguistic categories, one sees 
that these are not absolutes, because in language, everything is constructed, 
and therefore variable.  
 
Let us add one last example of the variable categorization in languages. 
Even a tool which may seem as fundamental as “yes/no” is not universal: 
certain languages (such as French and German) have a third term (si in 
French, doch in German), which serves to contradict a negative sentence; 
others, such as Latin and Chinese, have no words for “yes” or “no”. 
However, let us make it immediately clear that the fact that a concept has no 
corresponding linguistic category in a given language does not imply that its 
speakers cannot conceive of it or perceive it. Berlin and Kay (1969) show 
that speakers’ color perception does not depend on the (very variable) 
number of color names in their language. Just as languages which have no 
word for “yes” or “no” still have means for signifying agreement or 
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contradiction, but using other processes, for example by repeating just the 
verb with or without negation (“eat”/“not eat”), or yet by using the verb “to 
be” (“that be yours?” answer: “be”). Let us mention in passing that in this 
way Chinese has several negation possibilities: the notional negation marker 
bu and the event negation marker mei (see also the Greek mè and ouk). Thus 
these languages use different linguistic categories for expressing these 
shared notions.  
 
Languages therefore show equivalency relations, although construals and 
reference constructions are extremely variable. Firstly because of the 
previously mentioned segmentation and linguistic categorization, but also 
because of a second fundamental mechanism. To gain access to a same 
referent, languages construct variable reference pathways. 
1.1.2. Property selections and referential paths 
The meaning of a word is not limited to its referential value, i.e. the referent 
it designates. Languages usually choose one of the referent’s properties to 
designate it, for example a physical or functional characteristic. So, to come 
back to body parts, the index in French, or German, is the finger used for 
pointing (Zeigefinger), whereas in Greek it is the one which is used to lick 
(likhanós). In both cases, a different functional property is selected to 
designate the same referent. Access to reference therefore follows a 
different path in each language, a variable “referential path” (Corbin and 
Temple 1994)3. These examples show that the referential path chosen by a 
given language is both motivated (here linked to the functional properties of 
the referent) and therefore non-random, but since only one property is 
chosen, the choice is also arbitrary, or at least not strictly deterministic. 
Thus English designates a “used car” not by the fact that it is something one 
buys under favorable financial conditions, as in French (une voiture 
d’occasion), but rather by the fact that it was previously owned (or 
previously owned by only one other person as in a second-hand car). 
Therefore the property retained varies from language to language and 
probably refers to the trait considered the most salient for a given culture at 
a given point in time. But this does not imply that the meaning of the term is 
reduced to this one property: the referential path is just one means of 
reference accessing. The variability of referential paths across languages, as 
well as inside a given language, is due to a more general property of 
language, as claimed by cognitive linguistics, namely its ability to 
“construe” a particular situation in different ways (Langacker 1991a). 
 
The construction of different construals and variable referential paths to 
designate a referent explains the existence of synonyms within languages, 
                                                 
3 See also Langacker (1991b: 284) on compositional path. 
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such as voiture and automobile (“car”) in French. In the case of voiture 
(from the Latin vehere) the trait retained is that of being useful for 
“transporting” people or objects, whereas the trait retained for automobile is 
that of “being able to move on its own”. Just as record player and turn-table 
refer to the same thing, but after having followed different referential paths - 
the first term referring to the function and the second to the instrument’s 
mechanical apparatus (cf. Corbin & Temple, 1994: 10 on électrophone and 
tourne-disque in French).  
 
The fact that only one of a referent’s diverse properties is retained also 
explains the polyreference of certain terms. This is because very different 
objects can present a common property and thus be designated by a same 
term referring to that property. That greens can refer at once to expanses of 
grass, members of a political party and vegetables is due to the fact that 
English has chosen to designate these referents by a common property (the 
color green) which is considered salient and typical for each of the referents. 
In the same way, in French, the expression un bleu (“a blue one”) can 
designate a beginner, a new recruit, a work suit, a cheese, or a bruise, all of 
which have, in different ways, the common property of ‘being blue’ (Corbin 
& Temple, ibid.). This economy in designation contributes to the referential 
power of words and makes it productive. One can easily imagine the 
language using the same term green to designate new referents presenting 
the same salient characteristic, as indeed it already does in compound nouns 
such as green-card. This process of constructing reference by selecting 
properties considered common to different referents is therefore the source 
of internal meaning variation phenomena. But the semantics of a term 
cannot be reduced to its referential value, it also encompasses dimensions 
other than the referential path, dimensions which are part of its meaning and 
also constitute variation factors.  
1.1.3. The internal architecture of meaning and the referential background 
The manner in which the referent is designated also brings a complex 
semantic architecture into play. Designating an element generally entails the 
construction of a referential “background”. Thus the term hypotenuse 
usually designates the longest side of a right-triangle, which is opposite the 
right angle. The term refers to the side, designates it, but this designation 
only makes sense within the global representation implied by the right-
triangle in the background (Langacker 1991 a and b); the word tip refers to 
the extremity of an entity, but the meaning of the term takes into account the 
presence of the entity in the background (ibid). In the same way, concerning 
body-part terms, “essential to the characterization of expressions like head, 
arm, and leg is the position of the profiled entity relative to the body as a 
whole” (Langacker 1991b: 283). The same is true for the term uncle for 
example, which refers to a particular element within family relationships. 
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The meaning of uncle encompasses both the designated element and the 
structure of parental relations that it is part of. It should be noted that the 
categorization of these parental relations varies from language to language: 
some languages, such as Wolof, distinguish between the maternal uncle and 
the other uncles and aunts; others, such as German and English, have a 
category which groups brothers and sisters together, independently of their 
gender (Geschwister “siblings”). 
 
The point which we find important here is that the meaning of a term is part 
of a hierarchical architecture, a sort of landscape which includes both a 
background, “ground” (in Talmy 1978), “fond” (in Vandeloise 1986) or 
“base” (in Langacker 1991b), and a salient sub-structure within the 
background, the “figure”, “cible” (“goal”) or “profile” (ibid). The “figure” 
represents the designated element and the “ground” the background into 
which the figure is inserted.  
 
The base and profile constitute two components of meaning, they do not 
have the same status but are linked in forming a term’s meaning. According 
to Langacker (ibid), the construal of a term’s meaning is an operation 
through which one profiles a sub-structure upon a base. The profiled 
element constitutes the referential value, it is part of the meaning, along 
with the base. Therefore there is an architecture of meaning, marked by a 
grounded structure. To gain access to a same referential value, languages 
may carry out profilings on different grounds.  
1.2. Meaning’s malleability (polysemy and meaning shifts) 
Depending on the context, the meaning of a term varies. This variation is 
regulated by different mechanisms. There is always interaction between the 
terms present in the utterance (and between their respective properties). The 
association between one term and another, or even between a term and a 
given context, contributes in effect to the specification of its referential 
value. Thus a setting will not refer to the same thing depending on whether 
one is talking about a play or a ring. A tender steak is definitely not the 
same thing as a tender man. In both cases, the term’s application domain is 
different, which not only produces additional specifications but also 
“works” on the meaning of setting or tender which therefore are subject to 
deformation. We will come back to the modes of interaction a term has with 
its usage context (cf. 3.). However, through these different values, the term 
presents a certain stability of meaning, manifested by the fact that the 
language considers it a single unit. Between a square foot and a square 
person there is both a shift in the adjective’s meaning, and semantic 
properties which are kept. The question then becomes to arrive at a 
description of the term’s unity, the nature of the relations between its 
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different meanings as well as the mechanisms which produce the regulated 
variation. 
1.2.1 Metaphor 
There are two well known major mechanisms which pilot these meaning 
shifts: metonymy and metaphor. These are not simply elements of rhetoric, 
but fundamental linguistic mechanisms which regulate the variation in the 
meaning of units4.  
 
Metaphor is the transfer of properties from one domain to another to create a 
new referential value: some of a term’s semantic properties are selected 
(abstracted) and applied to another domain to designate a new entity in 
virtue of the properties considered shared by the two referents. For example, 
between a merchandise train and a train of thought, the word train does not 
have the same meaning, but the two meanings are linked together by a 
common semantic schema. Of the notion “train”, what is retained is the 
organization in successive units with identical function, linked to each other 
to form a complex unit. The shared properties are very abstract. They 
constitute a semantic schema that is present throughout all of the uses and 
which founds the semantic unity of the term. This is what Langacker 
(1991b) calls the ‘image schema’, Michaelis (1996) a ‘semantic super-
structure’ and Culioli a ‘schematic form’ (Culioli 1990: 115-135). This 
schematic form can be applied to different domains that it will inform. In 
the case of train, for example, it is applied both to a vehicle (an element in 
space) and to a series of thoughts (elements in time): by switching 
application domains, the term switches referential values. The schematic 
form (or image-schema) is thus defined as a form which generates other 
forms, a sort of meaning-producing matrix.  
 
Similarly, the adjective square presents in its different uses an identical 
schema where an object takes on the shape of a square, where all sides are 
of equal length. When applied not to an object but to a person, having a 
certain shape but not being a geometrical shape, the meaning of the term 
shifts to the mental properties of the individual, conceived of as 
encompassing certain angles, certain boundaries, a certain rigidity.  
 
In general, one speaks of “metaphor” when the shift takes between one 
particular use (generally a concrete one), considered the primary meaning, 
and another (generally more abstract), through a process of selecting 
properties which are transferred from the primary domain to the other, 
which is probably the case for the two meanings of the adjective square, or 
                                                 
4 I am speaking from the internal viewpoint of the meaning of units and not on the 
discourse level; the rhetoric of discourse distinguishes numerous figures of style for which 
an abundant literature exists, and which goes well beyond the scope of my paper here.  
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yet for the temporal meaning of the verb to go, probably derived from its 
meaning as a verb of movement. However, it is not always possible to 
reconstruct the history of a word, nor to say exactly what the primary 
meaning was from which a schematic form was abstracted and then applied 
to another domain. It is probable that in certain cases the terms represent an 
abstract semantic schema from the start which, during a same period in the 
history of the language, is applied to different domains: there is no shift 
from a primary meaning to a metaphorical meaning, but from the beginning 
the word functions in various domains. This is the case of the word nú for 
example in Gbaya (Central African Republic) which designates the active 
part of an element, and can therefore refer to the tip of a pin, the edge of a 
field, the opening of a basket, embers of a fire, and language, conceived of 
as humans’ activity par excellence (Roulon-Doko 2003). Furthermore, 
metaphors can be dynamic (creative and perceived as transfers, as in the 
wings of desire) or fixed and lexicalized (waiting in the wings of a stage). 
 
In the variation mechanism we are attempting to describe, the different 
meanings of a term are linked together through a common semantic schema 
(schematic form or image-schema) which represents a set of shared abstract 
properties. The schematic form which serves as the foundation of the 
semantic unity of the term (train for example) is never bare, but is always 
instantiated in a particular domain and with a usage context which gives it 


















Figure 1: Schematic form and polysemic network (vertical relation) 
 
Thus we would say that the semantic invariant (schematic form) represents 
the “signification” of the term and that its different usage values constitute 
  usage 1 
meaning 1 




(does not appear) 





in a domain 
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its various “meanings”. Linguists present different models for organizing 
these meanings among themselves and in relation to the schematic form (see 
Kleiber 1999, Lakoff 1987). According to Langacker (1991b), the different 
meanings themselves are organized in a radial manner, with a more or less 
high degree of schematicity. Moreover, one of the meanings is often 
considered prototypical, i.e. it often appears as the best representative of the 
term’s values (for example the meaning “means of transportation” for the 
word train).  
 
One is thus faced with what I would call a “vertical” type of relation 
between the term’s different meanings. The relation in effect passes through 
a common relation to a schematic form which transcends all the meanings 
but never appears directly: to explain the shift from one meaning to another, 
one must go back to the schematic form which is at the base of the term’s 
semantic unity. From one usage to another, one does not find all of a term’s 
semantic properties5, the properties specific to each use are linked to the 
term’s variable application domain (cf. 1.3. below) and to its particular 
properties (see the two meanings for pit in 3.1. below). Thus one sees that 
they are an important variation factor for a word’s meaning.  
 
Whether one calls it a metaphor or a schematic abstraction, the linguistic 
mechanism described here stems from a much more general and 
fundamental cognitive mechanism, that of analogy. Analogy rests on a 
homology between sometimes very different domains and on the perception 
of (abstract) properties seen as shared. From one meaning to the next, one 
finds both a common schema linked to these shared properties, and semantic 
properties specific to each usage, linked to the application domain. 
 
In metaphorical transfer, as shown by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), one 
transports a “form” but also inferences linked to the properties of the form6. 
This is an important point in the case of scientific vocabularies which, far 
from escaping the metaphorical process, on the contrary have frequent 
recourse to it, notably because it makes it possible to take something known 
as a basis for describing and naming something unknown.  
 
The “milky way”, “electric current”, the “earth’s crust”, the “hammer” in 
the middle ear, “noise” in information theory are coded metaphors whose 
inferences are probably conscious and controlled because they are part of 
precise scientific models which strongly constrain their referential values 
                                                 
5 In certain cases the organization of the different meanings is more complex and combines 
metaphorical (vertical) relations and metonymical (horizontal) relations. See below 1.2.3. 
6 “Metaphor is a cross-domain mapping with preserved inferences”. Besides, for Lakoff, 
metaphors do not reside in words but in systems, as he showed in particular for 
mathematics (Lakoff 1993, Lakoff & Núñez, 2000).  
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and limit the transfer of inferences. Moreover one notes that it is the 
knowledge of the theoretical background (and therefore the term’s 
application domain) that stabilizes the meaning effects of these metaphors. 
When the context is unknown, as in pedagogical situations, inference 
transfers are probably very powerful and may lead to an important gap 
between the conventional meaning and the meaning construed by the public 
who very normally proceed by analogy.  
 
Thus, for example, the term black hole also rests on metaphor. It designates 
“cosmic objects so massive that they attract light rays, bend them in on 
themselves, prevent them from escaping, whence their absence of color, 
their ‘blackness’ which makes them invisible”7 (Allègre 1995: 282, 
translation by Margaret Dunham). The astronomical metaphor rests on 
several shared properties between “holes” and these cosmic objects: both 
are containers, into which one falls, which are difficult to get out of and 
which trap you, furthermore they are black. But a “hole” supposes an 
emptiness which a priori risks being transferred (though inference) to the 
cosmic objects. Whereas for the latter, it is not their emptiness but rather 
their considerable mass which attracts objects and prevents them from 
escaping. The idea of mass and its physical effects are not part of the 
habitual meaning of “hole” where, on the contrary, emptiness plays the role 
of container-trap. To block this inference transfer, it is necessary to first set 
up the theoretical background of physics.  
 
It is not certain that the theoretician who created the neologism by metaphor 
to designate a new scientific object was aware of all the inferences 
transported by the metaphor. These can be very powerful and do actually 
play a structuring role in the scientific domain. For example, the 
computational theory of the mind which is prevalent in cognitive sciences 
rests on an initial metaphor, that of the mind seen as a computer (Bruner 
1992). This metaphor has generated an entire theoretical apparatus (the 
brain’s “hardware” and “software”, “computation”, cognitive “pre-wiring”, 
“input”, “output”...). However the analogical process was erased: in the 
initial approach, it was a question of simulating mental processes using 
computers, it then became a case of describing them using computers, then 
it was a question of describing them using the computer as a model 
(metaphor), lastly, in a third stage, some began considering the brain as 
being a computer, a thinking machine (whence identification between the 
two domains, disappearance of the analogy). This founding metaphor whose 
heuristic process was erased, had considerable and often unwitting 
consequences, linked to the transfer of inferences. Thus, notably, because of 
                                                 
7 “Des objets cosmiques si massifs qu'ils attirent les rayons lumineux, les courbent sur eux-
mêmes, les empêchent de sortir, d'où leur absence de couleur, leur 'noirceur' qui les rend 
invisibles” 
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the computer model, human thought has been seen as an autonomous 
system based on the manipulation of formal symbols which could be 
described in terms of logic and algebra, and everything that did not belong 
to the rational domain (emotions, perception) was removed from its 
workings. Because of the transfer of computer properties to thought, another 
shift took place, surreptitious but crucial, from the notion of signification to 
that of information (Bruner ibid). The problem of meaning in cognitive 
science has thus unconsciously been reduced to the domain of information 
processing. Information theory deals with the modalities of the transfer of 
information but not with those of constructing information, which was 
thereby removed from the field of cognitive science. Signification was then 
treated as a stable product (information to be transmitted), already a given in 
the input and thus not submitted to construction. The initial metaphor here 
had considerable impact on the definition of the object to be described and 
the model produced.  
 
When metaphorical denominations are new, their scientific impact is 
therefore not always quantifiable. Thus physicists trying to explain nuclear 
forces using properties associated with nuclear particles (one of which was 
even baptized gluon, meaning “that which sticks”), attributed qualities to 
them which represent inferences based on metaphorical transfers (quarks 
have “colors”, “flavors”, “charm”) for which the corresponding physical 
properties are not very clear (Allègre 1995: 230). It is therefore a question 
of thinking of a domain in terms of another by virtue of analogy and shared 
properties. But what the impact of the transfer of inferences in the 
construction of a model in particle physics will be, is difficult to say at the 
start. 
 
So metaphors, in both the scientific domain and in general, are based on a 
fundamental cognitive mechanism which makes it possible to think of one 
domain in terms of another, through analogy. This process surely has 
heuristic and/or pedagogical virtues, and a certain cognitive efficiency. 
From a linguistic point of view, it allows a remarkable systemic economy 
and adaptability: a single unit gives access to several referents, an old term 
can be adapted to new realities or new concepts (on this last point, see the 
detailed studies carried out by Vidalenc 1997). 
 
But words are not concepts, they are “representation triggers” which present 
specific structural and functional properties and carry, along with their 
referential values, a whole fabric of structured relations (see 1.3. below on 
depth). Whence the “danger” which menaces language communication, that 
of the surreptitious import of representations and properties through 
inference. This danger is partly controlled, generally speaking, by the 
specification of a term’s meaning within the utterance (cf. 3.), and in science 
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through linking the term to a model which is most often explicit and 
constrained (through definitions, explicit descriptions of the properties and 
insertion in a specific model). The model constructs the value of the term in 
the background, and constitutes the term’s application domain. It is when 
the application domain is entirely specified that the term becomes a 
technical one, linked to a true scientific concept. It is therefore, in science as 
in ordinary language, first and foremost the articulation within a specific 
context which stabilizes the ambiguities in the meanings of a term.  
1.2.2. Metonymy 
The second well known major mechanism for regulating meaning is 
metonymy. Traditionally speaking, metonymy is described as a shift in the 
referential value based on a relation of contiguity: the meaning of a term is 
transferred from one referent to another, by virtue of the contiguity relations 
between the two referents. Thus through metonymy, the blue helmets refer 
to the soldiers of the U.N. instead of referring to the helmets themselves; in 
to have a glass, the term glass can either designate the object or, through 
metonymical shift, its contents. These meaning shifts are based on the 
widespread mechanism of metonymy. Let us note that the term contiguity 
here is used in a very abstract sense; it can refer to relations of a variable 
nature such as the container for the contents (a glass), a part for the whole8 
(a roof for a house), but also a cause for an effect (I like Schubert = I like 
Schubert’s works), the place of origin for the product (a Bourgogne), a 
place for the institution which resides there (the decisions of the White 
House), a body part for the moral properties associated with it (have guts)... 
One can also consider as metonymical transfer the use of a brand name (or 
of an element of a category) to designate any element of that category, as in 
the case of fridge (Frigidaire in French) for refrigerator. Metonymy can 
take place through syntagmatic reduction: it is possible that the use of 
Schubert to refer to his works is based on the reduction of the phrase I like 
(the works of) Schubert, the same for a (wine from) Bourgogne. Certain 
syntagmatic reductions are historically attested: thus the French term foie 
(“liver”) comes from the Latin expression iecur ficatum, a culinary term 
which originally designated the “liver (of a duck), iecur, fattened on figs, 
ficatum” of which only the beginning remained, ficatum (“enfigged”) > foie 
“liver” (Traugott and Hopper 1993: 81). Through metonymy, the term 
ended up designating not only this particular type of liver, but any liver. 
From the viewpoint of linguistic processes, the foie is therefore a variant of 
the refrigerator! The contiguity which links these different referential 
values is therefore always conceptual but is sometimes also accompanied by 
contiguity between the syntactic constituents.  
 
                                                 
8 In this case it is called a synecdoche, but at this level of analysis, the distinction does not 
seem important as they both make use of the same mechanism.  
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Beside these well known cases, Traugott and Hopper (1993: 80-93) mention 
a particularly interesting type of metonymy, where two meanings of a term 
are linked by a relation of inference. They give the example of the Germanic 
hwile (>wile) “time” which is the origin of the English while and the 
German weil (“because”). The adverbial phrase “at the time when” which 
uses this term (along with a distal demonstrative in the accusative and an 
invariable subordinator equivalent to “that” which were later 
morphologically reduced), first expressed the simultaneity of two events 
then, through inference, a causal link between the two events. Thus in Old 
English, in the sentence corresponding to “that disaster lasted the nineteen 
winters while (wile) Stephen was king”, the subordinate took on the 
meaning of “because Stephen was king”. From concomitant links one infers 
a link of causality. It is this value that was lexicalized in the German weil, 
which comes from the same hwile with a temporal meaning (as in Weile 
“moment, time”, verweilen “stay”) but which lost its temporal origins and 
no longer has any meaning but the causal one of “because”. In Tswana 
(Bantu), the verb “to get up (in the morning)” also functions as an auxiliary 
meaning “do (something) the next day”. D. Creissels (2001) analyzes the 
emergence of this second meaning through a process of semanticization (or 
lexicalization) of pragmatic inferences, linked to the fact that humans tend 
to make the alternation sleep/wake coincide with the alternation day/night. 
So if a human says “when I get up” one can, in the absence of contrary 
indications, infer that the person is referring to “tomorrow morning” 
because the prototypical getting up is the getting up which follows the 
night’s sleep. From the meaning “to get up doing something” one passed, 
through the lexicalization of the pragmatic inference, to the meaning “do 
something the next morning”. The semantic shift was accompanied by a 
syntactic reanalysis (auxiliarization process), but also belongs to the domain 
of metonymy from a semantic view point: the contiguity link is not simply a 
physical contiguity between the two referents but a contiguity of events.  
 
Which is why I will follow here the more general definition given by 
Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39), following Lakoff: “Metonymy is a 
cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides 
mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same 
domain”. The first important point in this definition of metonymy is that this 
linguistic mechanism is defined as a cognitive process and that it is 
described in terms of “access” to a conceptual entity. As for metaphors, it is 
not just a question of relations between words and things, but a question of 
the relations between the conceptual representations carried by words, as is 
shown by the diverse contiguity relations described here (part/whole, 
cause/effect...). Words are representation triggers and metonymy is a 
cognitive process which makes it possible for one word to trigger access to a 
new representation. It is noteworthy that in the case of metonymy, there is a 
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dissymmetry: one of the representations is the vector for the other, it is the 
entrance point through which the target is accessed; therefore it functions as 
a salient feature of the second representation9 and the contiguity link 
between the two representations constitutes the referential path which gives 
access to the second one.  
 
The second important point is that, contrary to metaphors which are based 
on the transfer of properties from one domain to another, metonymy 
operates within the same domain: it allows the transfer of referential values 
within a single semantic domain. Which is why I propose to describe the 
metonymical links between a term’s two meanings as relations of a 
“horizontal” type; one must note however that, there too, the relation 
between the two meanings is mediated by an abstraction process that here is 
not based on analogy (as for metaphors) but rather on a link between 




Figure 2: The metonymical link (horizontal relation) 
 
Metonymical shifts can happen repeatedly in the history of a word. Thus the 
French term bureau initially designated a piece of rough cloth (bure) placed 
on the table where one worked. Then, through metonymy, it designated the 
table itself (“desk”), before, through a second metonymy, coming to 
designate the room where the table is found (“office”). It is probably 
undergoing further metonymy in designating the activities carried out in the 
room, as in des horaires de bureau “office hours”. Similarly, the term pen, 
from the Late Latin penna “feather” first served to designate a feather object 
for writing (“quill”), then the pointed metal object which replaced the 
feather, then the stylistic qualities of those using the instrument (a witty 
pen). One can see through this example that the referential value of a term 
can survive its demotivation (loss of the link between the object “feather” 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed analysis of the different types of metonymy as well as the cognitive 
processes at work, see the article by Kövecses and Radden (1998). 
metonymical process : 
conceptualization of 
contiguity
The blue helmets 
meaning 1 = part 
The blue helmets 
meaning 2 = U.N. soldiers 
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and the value “writer”). We will see in the following section, with the 
example of fox (and also in 2.1. for the example of souris), that metaphor 
and metonymy can also be combined.  
1.2.3. Combining metaphor and metonymy 
Interestingly, metaphor and metonymy can combine in the polysemic 
network. For instance a fox can refer to the wild animal, but also to its fur 
(metonymy), a coat made of its fur (second metonymy) as well as to an 
attractive woman (metaphor). As mentioned by Balbachan (2006), Lipka 
(1990 a and b) “identifies two typical processes where metaphors and 
metonymy take place, showing a general schema as a lexical rule for 
semantic shift or transfer: radial shift and chaining shift”. To illustrate these 
two types of networks, he gives the example of two polysemic words: 
English head which shows a radial shift and English volume which 
manifests a chaining shift, as illustrated in the following figures. 
















sememe Meaning     ‘head ‘ 
S1 upper part of human body 
S2 seat of intellect 
S3 life (cf. it cost him his head) 
S4 image of head on one side of 
coin 
S5 knobbed end of nail 
S6 foam on top of liquor 
S7 top of page 
S8 fully developped part of boil 
S9 end of table occupied by host 
S4S3S2S1 
metonymy    metonymy     metaphor
sememe Meaning     ‘volume ‘ 
S1 roll of parchment (disappeared) 
S2 book tome 
S3 size, bulk of a book 
S4 size, bulk of other things 
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Figure 4 : Chaining shift (from Balbachan 2006) 
1.2.4. Active zones and contextual interactions 
Let us further mention an important factor in the semantic variation of 
terms: interaction with the context. Plasticity in terms is also largely 
conditioned by their interaction with the verbal and situational contexts, 
which produce a veritable “work” on the meaning of lexical units, defining 
landmarks, attractors and “active zones”, producing coercion, semantic 
shifts or semantic layerings. These processes will be presented in section 3. 
because they contribute to the stabilization of the word’s meaning in 
language use. 
1.3. The depth dimension of language 
1.3.1. Semantic universes: frames and scenarios 
So far, we have described semantic structures and mechanisms allowing 
meaning shifts, but the meaning of linguistic units is not limited to these 
meaning matrices. Linguistic units, in effect, are linked to semantic 
universes, to representational backdrops which contribute to the value of a 
term’s meanings and which themselves can be highly structured. The terms 
buy and sell for example, designate a particular action between two 
participants which implies a history of variable but codified mercantile 
relations depending on the language and culture, which Fillmore has called 
“frames” or “scenes” (Fillmore 1977, 1982)10. However, these extra-
linguistic factors have an impact, either direct or indirect, on the semantics 
of the terms and on their use; the notion of “frames” is intended to capture 
useful chunks of encyclopedic knowledge relevant to the usage of linguistic 
units (Goldberg 1995: 26). Thus the term bachelor is often defined as a man 
who is not married. But this definition is not sufficient for rendering either 
its values or its usage; the term implies a precise cultural background which 
explains why one would not easily say that the Pope or a hermit is a 
bachelor. The term weekend of course profiles a certain part of the seven-
day cycle, but a full understanding of its meaning implies to know a larger 
semantic (and cultural) frame by which Saturday and Sunday are non-
working days therefore associated with leisure, sport, camping… (Fillmore 
1982). Furthermore, the notion of frame often explains the difference 
between two synonyms: for instance the words roe and caviar refer to the 
same entity but are associated with different frames, anatomical or 
gastronomical (Langacker 1987: 164-65).  
 
                                                 
10 See Martin (2001) for an elaboration on the notion of “frame” and its role in polysemy. 
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In Ibo (a Kwa language of Nigeria), one thus finds eighteen terms for “to 
buy” depending on the nature and conditioning of the object, but also on the 
circumstances of the sale, the particular gesture associated with it, the 
quantity or fractioning of the object, whether the seller is obliged to travel, if 
the person one asks to buy will pay or not, etc... (Chukwe 1997). The 
different customs in the background directly intervene in the semantics of 
the verb as they are categorized in the language. And one sees that the 
scenarios underlying the signification of a meaning are culture-dependant. 
But these scenarios can also be indirectly linked to the term’s meaning. 
Thus in English, white is associated with marriage because of particular 
customs, namely the marriage ceremony and the color of the bride’s dress. 
The presence of this scenario in the background has the effect of generating 
connotations associated with this color; it induces diverse “resonances”: it is 
a positive color, it evokes purity, virginity, the intact nature of an entity, its 
innocence (white as snow for “innocent”). Again, the associated scenarios 
and the connotations stemming from them vary from culture to culture: in 
China, red is the color of weddings and white that of mourning; white 
therefore will not have the same connotations as in English, and will 
certainly not evoke virginity. These connotations linked to background 
scenarios are indeed part of the term’s meaning, and play an important role 
in a term’s stylistic effects and meaning variations within utterances.  
 
We have seen that linguistic units often function through the selection of 
one of the referent’s properties to designate it, which leads to a property 
being used to designate several different referents (cf. greens or bleu). 
Linguistic units thereby constitute access paths to a complex representation 
fabric or network. Through its different values, a single term refers to 
different scenarios: that greens can refer to vegetables reflects the fact that 
the tops, the leaves, of vegetables are of that color; that greens can refer to 
members of a political party is due to the fact that they tend to use green 
banners; in British and American history, greens were pieces of land 
reserved for common use in each village, first for grazing purposes, then for 
recreational uses. Thus one sees that these scenarios are historically and 
culturally grounded. In certain cases, when a scenario no longer has 
historical validity, it becomes demotivated, and can even disappear. This is 
the case for the French bleu, which, among many other meanings, referred 
to young army recruits who usually showed up wearing their blue work 
clothes. With the end of obligatory military service, this term may 
eventually fall into disuse. However, history has given us new oppositions, 
as with the greens (ecologists) and the reds (communists), which are 
probably metonymic designations (“who bear green banners”, “who bear 
red banners”). There are also new background scenarios which lead to the 
emergence of new referential values, such as un blanc which formerly in 
French referred to a royalist soldier (whose uniform was white), but now 
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belongs to a different paradigm linked to completely new reference values 
referring to wine.  
1.3.2. Connotations 
As we saw above, languages create network relations within the semantics 
of words (metonymic or metaphorical relations between meanings, relations 
between a schematic form and its different instantiations, relations between 
different referential values, different scenarios or semantic universes), but 
they also associate various connotations with a term’s meaning. As we saw 
with the example of white, a term’s connotations vary from culture to 
culture, and also according to its different uses. These connotations explain 
certain synonymic variations: car, automobile and jalopy are synonyms but 
are distinguished by their different registers and connotations, as is also true 
for jaundice and hepatitis. These connotations serve to signal a social role 
(which can be momentary) played by the speaker, or the speaker’s 
belonging to a specific social group. Similarly, using the expression father 
to designate a priest signifies that the speaker is a practicing catholic, 
contrary to using priest or clergyman. In the same way, using the heat for 
“policeman” signals belonging to a certain age group and general ideology. 
In fact, choosing a term for its connotations allows speakers both to situate 
themselves intersubjectively (as regards the group) and to express one’s 
position, one’s judgment on what is being talked about. On the discourse 
level, connotative choices permit argumentative strategies based at least 
partly on identification phenomena, largely exploited by publicists (see 
Honeste 1997, Grunig 1990).  
 
Certain connotative values can be more generally associated with words, so 
that they carry uncontrolled resonances in a given culture. Such is the case 
for the term North for example. For many French people, the term calls up 
thoughts of cold, grey, wet weather, and for Parisians, the daily grind, which 
are all negative values; moreover it is opposed to diverse positive 
representations of the South: sun, joy, feeling good, vacation, because of 
seasonal habits which are quite specifically French. Therefore avoidance 
strategies are developed for example by the departments and institutions in 
the North of France. The Artois University Press has thus been prettily 
renamed “Septentrion Press”. The term septentrion is a synonym for North, 
but has neither the same distribution (usage contexts) nor the same semantic 
resonances; it is an old term, associated with a poetic and literary universe 
which calls up all sorts of other associations. These two terms then have the 
same referential value but not at all the same meaning. And if the 
department Côtes du Nord successfully changed its name to Côtes d’Armor, 
it was both to avoid the negative associations with the North and to endow 
itself with a more fitting denomination, both geographically and culturally: 
the Côtes d’Armor are in the north of Brittany rather than in the north of 
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France, moreover they have a specific history which the term Armor 
positively evokes. This new name, in effect, is wound up in a very different 
network of associations and connotations: it not only brings to mind the 
Celtic legends, but also the formal echoes between Armor and Amor.  
1.3.3. The depth dimension of language: fabric of networks 
To the fabric of diverse semantic relations which units enter into (Armor 
and Celtic legends), one may also add a network of formal relations, either 
etymological or not (Armor and amor), between units. These relations vary 
greatly from language to language, and probably even from one individual 
to another because they are built on both social and individual experiences, 
and each one generates diverse association representations. For the present 
writer, the term uncle of course calls up the domain and structure of kinship 
relations, but also the book Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and her own uncle who had 
a house in the Alps and hence the memory of winter sports, and so forth. 
The cognitive reality of these formal relations between non related terms is 
also visible both in slips of the tongue and in puns. I will not go into the 
details of the diverse morphological relations that are set up in the 
paradigms here (cf. Robert 2003). These morphological relations 
(etymological or not) thereby produce echo phenomena between the terms 
of a language (Amo - Armor): the formal relationship induces semantic 
relationships between the different notions, connotations or values 
associated with each of the terms.  
 
Depending on the language, words resonate in an extremely variable way, 
depending both on the physical and cultural contexts and on the rest of the 
language’s lexicon. The linguistic units trigger representations which are 
caught up in a complex network of relations, at once language internal and 
external, semantic and formal. This web of relations and associations that 
links linguistic to extra-linguistic matter, constitutes what I call “the depth 
dimension of language” (“l’épaisseur du langage”, Robert 1999, 2003). 
Depth constitutes a third dimension in language, as opposed to the 
syntagmatic dimension (relations between the utterance’s terms) and the 
paradigmatic dimension (relations between the terms that may potentially 
occupy the same spot in the utterance); it is what makes the meaning 
“subjective and open-ended” (Lichtenberk 1991)11. This depth dimension 
constitutes the semantics of a term, and in a way represents the extremely 
variable harmonics that the semantic-structure-as-fundamental-frequency 
gives rise to. The depth of language is a complex area where linguistics 
                                                 
11  “A term may  have a primary meaning, but its total meaning subsumes not only this 
primary meaning, central designation, but also all the other more or less peripheral aspects 
of the situations in which the term is used.” (Lichtenberk 1991: 480) 
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associates both with linguistic and extra-linguistic matter and which plays 
an important role in the construal of an utterance’s meaning (Robert 1999). 
 
The following table, which is certainly far from being exhaustive, lists the 
different components of the meaning of linguistic units that we have 
highlighted here. They gather together variation factors that are at once 
internal (within languages) and external (from language to language): 
 
- world segmentation and categorization 
- referential paths 
- profiling: internal architecture (figure and ground) 
- plasticity and meaning shifts (metaphor, metonymy) 
- referential scales 
- variable application domains (instantiation) 
- depth: - scenarios and semantic universes  
 - networks of formal and semantic relations between terms 
 - connotations 
 - associations between linguistic and extralinguistic  
   representations  
 
 Table 1:  Processes involved in the words’ meaning 
2. The problem of transparency and referential accessibility  
2.1. Motivation 
Thus far, we have examined the different mechanisms for constructing the 
meaning of terms, such as property selection and referential paths, transfer 
processes through metaphor or metonymy. In these different cases, meaning 
is construed through a referential process which is indirect but also 
transparent and motivated. This motivation most probably plays a role in 
how these terms are stored in the memory (by linking different meanings 
together or by linking a meaning with the physical and cultural properties of 
the referent) as well as in the cognitive accessibility of the referent.  
 
However, this referential transparency varies within a language as well as 
from language to language. Within languages, the semantics of terms is not 
always motivated and the modalities of reference accessing may be opaque 
for different reasons (see below). Furthermore, referential efficiency among 
terms may vary within languages, as well as from language to language, for 
the “same” term. Thus languages present varied strategies for reference 
accessing which are partially linked to their morphological, and therefore 
formal, properties. 
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The specific problems raised by technical term translation and 
terminological creation are particularly interesting on this head, as they 
bring to light the necessity for efficient designations, whether it be a 
question of procedures to follow in case of emergency, translating traffic 
regulations, instruction manuals, or even school books and teaching 
materials. It is most probably necessary to introduce as much motivation in 
the designations as possible. This entails either transparency in the 
referential paths, or retaining the most salient properties within the culture 
to designate the referent.  
 
Thus to indicate the blinking cursor which shows its position on a computer 
screen, French used, in succession, first curseur then souris (“mouse”). The 
term curseur has fallen into disuse because visibly connected to an era when 
screens had a different presentation, and rested on a metaphor linked to a 
slide rule and to the movement of a mobile element along the ruler. The 
term souris (“mouse”) is based on a metaphor then on a metonymical 
extension. It began by designating the element which serves to transmit the 
hand’s movements to the screen: the metaphor was based on the shape of 
this element (small and oval) and on the (rapid) movements it made 
possible; then, through metonymy, the term souris (“mouse”) came to 
signify not the element moved by hand, but the element it affected on the 
screen. The salient properties that made this metaphorical shift of the term 
souris (“mouse”) possible were the size and movements of the object. While 
trying to create terminology in Banda (Central African Republic), as 
described by M. Diki-Kidiri, for the same element it was the term for firefly 
that was retained; the salient properties which seemed the most suggestive 
being size and luminosity on a dark background (as were the screens at that 
time). These privileged paths are certainly linked to the cultural world. 
 
In fact, the cognitive efficiency of metaphors is often based on the existence 
of a world of wider cultural references which are not always transposable 
from one language to another. As J. L. Vidalenc showed (1997: 143), the 
metaphorical expression scientific frontier, used in American scientific 
presentations, refers more to Westerns and to the American “frontier” 
culture associated with them than to the sources usually called upon in 
scientific communications. Such an expression would certainly not have the 
same meaning for a French public. 
 
Certain general metaphors do not exist in all languages. In English, up and 
down are associated with turning a machine on and off, as in the expression 
to shut down the computer. This analogy between movement and turning 
something on or off is not the same in French, where downward movement 
is rather associated with something falling, and probably breaking. This 
association is so strong that it prevented me for a long time from using the 
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entry shut down in the scroll menu on my computer, for fear of breaking 
something... 
 
In other words, we are faced with an apparent paradox: it is probably by 
taking what is most typical culturally in a language that one is able to 
construct the best “equivalences” between languages and not by taking 
universal invariants conceived of as having a minimum of common 
contents.  
 
It would certainly be interesting to carry out experiments on the possible 
existence, in different cultures, of privileged access paths to reference: 
spatial trajectories, functional property selection (cf. index above) or tactile 
properties (linked for example to manipulability which probably plays a role 
for certain classifiers in Chinese), visual properties (it is because of their 
long and thin shape that the terms “fish”, “stick”, “street” and “necklace” in 
Mandarin have the same classifier tiao). The olfactive properties of referents 
seem to be more rarely selected as salient. Corbin and Temple (1994) note 
however the French term fenouillette which designates a variety of apple 
whose smell evokes that of fennel (French fenouil).  
 
But the degree of transparency in terms also depends on language specific 
morphological factors. German presents a remarkable degree of 
transparency in compound words, transparency which is linked to the clarity 
of its compositional rules and the flexibility of its particles (Pérennec 1997). 
Furthermore, specialist vocabularies in German, much more than in French, 
with English somewhere in the middle, make widespread use of so-called 
folk roots. One can compare the German Unterhaut (lit. “under-skin”) to its 
English equivalent derm, or Einbaumboot (lit. “one-tree-boat”) to its 
English equivalent monoxyl canoe (also known as a dugout in everyday 
speech). The German terms thus show a remarkable referential transparency 
as compared to English. Although the semantic interpretation still 
necessitates recourse to encyclopedic knowledge, the mode for accessing 
the referent is transparent.  
 
Concerning this last example, one notes that the precision of the reference 
path or its explicit character do not necessarily imply that the reference is 
accessed more quickly. The English monoxyl is a constructed term which is 
explicit in its referential path (“made of a single piece of wood”) but it 
makes use of (Greek) roots which are opaque for most speakers. Similarly, 
most chemistry terms, such as cupritetramine and desoxyribonucleic are 
analytical terms, explicit and free of ambiguity, but opaque for non 
specialists. Because referential accessibility implies not only an explicit 
(analytic) reference path but also knowledge of the theoretical background, 
i.e. the term’s application domain. Depending on the speaker’s knowledge, 
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the referential path may be transparent even though the reference is opaque. 
Inversely, a vague term may be referentially efficient, because of its usage 
conditions. 
2.2. Opacity and accessibility 
All terms in a language are not always “constructed words” or “defined 
descriptions” which furnish the speakers with (always partial) descriptions 
of the referent. In effect, there are, within languages, different strategies for 
accessing references, especially through analytical processes (as with the 
preceding examples) or “direct” processes. Of course referenciation is 
always mediated as it is transmitted via units which refer to representations 
constructed by the language, but access to the reference can be carried out 
either through constructions (analytic processes), or through encoded units 
as such, which are unanalyzable (as with proper names for example, or more 
generally, mono-elementary units such as table or glass), which form 
meaning blocks. Let us quote the famous distinction proposed by Frege 
between the different denominations for a single planet: Venus, which is a 
proper name and constitutes a mono-elementary unit, the evening star, or 
the morning star (to which one could add the shepherd’s star), which 
constitute definite descriptions, i.e. analytical ones. The same is true for the 
Castafiore and the Milanese Nightingale.  
 
In strategies of reference construction, the referential path may be opaque, 
either because the coded unit is not analyzable (table) or because 
demotivation has taken place, and the compound meanings have been lost. 
This is the case for example for turkey, a term which originally designated a 
fowl from Turkey, but with the fowl becoming widespread, the 
metonymical path was lost. The American states of Louisiana, Virginia, 
Georgia and the Carolinas all bear testimony to the monarchs ruling at the 
time of their conquest. The name Alsatia (“Alsace”), literally “other seat”, 
designated a foreign settlement, referring to the Germans who had settled 
west of the Rhine. The fact that this area was considered a sort of enclave 
led to the term being used derogatively in London to refer to the White 
Friars precinct which had become a sanctuary for debtors and law breakers, 
and thus an asylum for criminals. 
This complicated path followed by the semantic shift is totally opaque 
nowadays (Shipley, 1984: 344). 
 
The case of grève in French is another nice example of demotivation. This 
name has two meanings: (1) it designates a “beach strand or river bank” and 
(2) it refers to one of France’s national specialties, namely “strikes” (to be 
on strike). Originally, these two meanings were linked by a double 
metonymy: the “place de Grève” (lit. The Strand place) was the name of a 
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place in Paris, close to the Seine’s bank; at a certain time in history, the 
workers would meet in this place to protest against their working conditions. 
Hence, the phrase “être en (place) de grève” took on the meaning “to stop 
working and go to this place for protesting”. Later, this expression became 
autonomous (as in une grève importante “an important strike”) and the link 
with the particular geographical place was lost: the metonymic shift was 
demotivated and the two meanings appeared to belong to two homophonic 
terms, corresponding to what Lichtenberk (1991) calls a case of 
„heterosemy“12. Today, the referential path of grève is opaque. But its 
meaning is not. 
 
In fact, opacity of the referential path does not necessarily imply opacity of 
the term’s referential value, nor its inaccessibility, just as the path’s 
transparency does not guarantee transparency of reference. In effect, most 
acronyms such as LASER, AIDS or DNA represent opaque referential paths 
for most speakers. However, their referents remain accessible (at least to a 
certain degree), especially as these objects are part of a familiar universe; 
the term then functions as a sort of coded unit within the language. 
 
Similarly, the referential value of a term generally survives its demotivation, 
as is the case for example for the plumber (from the French plomb “lead”) 
which still designates the same category of workers even though they no 
longer repair lead piping. Another interesting example is also given by Lee 
(2001: 10) which is the case of the English bug (1. ‘insect’, 2. ‘fault in a 
computer program’). This term was first used when a problem with one of 
the early computers was found to be due to the presence of a dead insect in 
its innards and therefore used in its original sense concerning a problem 
with the computer. However, this situation involved the activation of a new 
frame (computer programming), which was the source of new semantics for 
the term that came to refer to any fault in a computer program, even when 
unrelated to the presence of an insect in the machine. The rate of the 
(formal) evolution in words does not necessarily follow that of their 
referents. This discrepancy does not hinder speakers because the 
relationship between form and meaning is fundamentally arbitrary and 
coded, even if occasionally motivated. What is crucial is that the term have 
meaning for the speakers, namely that it permit access to a common 
representation; if the relationship between the linguistic form and the 
representation attached to it is most often arbitrary as concerns the system of 
the language, from the speaker’s viewpoint, it no longer is from the moment 
the representation is acquired: a table is a table. It is therefore most probably 
                                                 
12 “In heterosemy, the semantic (as well as the formal) properties of the elements are too 
different to form a single conceptual category. Rather, the category has only a historical 
basis: what unites its members is their common ultimate source” (Lichtenberk, 1991: 480). 
 
To appear (2008), in Martine Vanhove (ed), From polysemy to semantic change: towards a 
typology of lexical semantic associations, Typological Studies in Language, Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins: 55-92.  
 
VERSION NON CORRIGEE 
 
when it is a question of gaining access to a new representation, as in the 
case of terminology creation, that motivation and transparency in the 
referential path are the most important. But path transparency and referential 
accessibility do not necessarily go together.  
 
This discrepancy between path opacity and referential transparency can be 
explained, in my view, by a more general linguistic mechanism. I think that 
on the discourse level, namely when units are used in an utterance, there are 
two modes for forming meaning: by quotation or by construction. In fact, 
from a structural point of view, discourse makes use of different types of 
units: either simple units (table), constructed units (be they derived: dancer, 
compounded: pillowcase or phrases: head of hair). These different 
structures probably give rise to different modes of constructing meaning and 
reference access, in the production or comprehension of the utterance: on 
one hand certain junctures are formed at the time of speaking (construction 
formation mode); on the other hand, certain structures function as fully 
fledged units (“coded units”), stored in the memory as wholes and used 
more or less as such in the sentence (quotation formation mode). These two 
utterance modes are most probably both necessary for speech. The first 
ensures the creativity and plasticity necessary for language, the second 
ensures economy in individuals’ efforts and interpersonal comprehension.  
 
However, it seems to me that these two meaning production modes do not 
necessarily follow the linguistic structure of the units being used: some 
complex units may, from the point of view of production and reference 
access, function as simple units, produced through citation and not 
construction. The expression head of hair probably usually functions as a 
simple unit and the speaker (and listener) probably do not construct its 
meaning by analytically following the term’s referential path. Just as in 
toothbrush one does not necessarily hear tooth, and in an instrument’s 
mouthpiece one does not necessarily activate the term mouth. This is why 
transparency of reference paths does not necessarily go hand in hand with 
the accessibility of the referent: it all depends on the reference construction 
mode during discourse. These two construction modes also apply to 
structures larger than the word, and even entire sentences. Proverbs (April 
showers bring May flowers) and certain set expressions (hard as Job, to 
smoke like a chimney, to keep a stiff upper lip) generally belong, on one 
count or another, to the quotation mode: when speakers use them, they do 
not usually build them up from their individual components, but quote them 
as fully formed units. However, the latent referential path of set expressions 
can be reactivated. This is often what happens in puns or advertisements 
which frequently consist in bringing to the surface opaque referential paths. 
The varying activation of component meanings then depends on the specific 
dynamics of the sentence. 
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3. Construing meaning in discourse: stabilization mechanisms 
Linguistic units present ambivalences and potential semantic overloads due 
to their polysemy and their representational depth, the complex fabric of 
relations they enter into. However, in language activity, units never appear 
on their own, but always in a verbal and situational context, inserted in 
utterances where all of their values are not present. Following the tenets of 
cognitive semantics (Langacker 1987 and 1991, Talmy 2000), we consider 
that “instead of thinking in terms of words as expressing ‘concepts’, we 
should think of them as tools that cause listeners to activate certain areas of 
their knowledge base, with different areas activated to different degrees in 
different contexts of use” (Lee 2001: 10). Being used in discourse, the 
context “acts on” the meaning of the units and constrains their 
interpretation. More generally, discourse, through different relating 
mechanisms, makes it possible to progressively build the reference frame 
and “verbal scene” (Victorri 1997) which will specify both the meaning of 
each unit and that of the sentence. Thus reference is always construed 
contextually through a dynamic process, for which we will mention a few of 
the mechanisms here. These meaning construal mechanisms in discourse 
contribute both to the general polysemy of the term and to the stabilization 
of its meaning within a particular utterance. 
3.1. Application domains, meaning attractors and semantic isotopics 
3.1.1. Application domains 
In their different uses, words are always invested, instantiated in 
“application domains” which define their semantic incidence and contribute 
to creating their referential value and contextual meaning. Incidence 
domains are important for terms because they contribute both to the 
variation (plasticity) of their potential meanings and to their stabilization in 
the utterance. A change in the application domain and semantic universe of 
a term can produce a meaning shift and a radical change in its referential 
value. As mentioned by Sinclair (1998: 7), the meaning of white when 
followed by wine (as in white wine), refers to a different color range (from 
almost colorless to yellow, light orange or light green), than when it is not 
so followed. Furthermore, depending on the context, a term can be linked to 
a different semantic universe, while keeping its profile. This is the case for 
example of the word pit, which refers both to a hole or cavity in the ground 
and a certain seating area in a theatre or auditorium. In both cases, it 
represents an element of the same general shape as well as certain shared 
functional properties (it is usually hollowed out with the intention of 
containing people or objects, and is usually below ground or below the level 
of surrounding people) but its application to different semantic universes 
entails a completely different referential value in either case, as well as 
wholly divergent associated properties (negative as in the saying “it’s the 
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pits!” and positive as being some of the best seats for seeing the scene in the 
theatre). The different semantic universes the terms are linked to are 
therefore the source of the variation in the units’ meanings, but also play the 
inverse functional role in disambiguating the construal of a term’s meaning 
in discourse.  
 
How are these application domains and semantic universes specified? By 
the verbal context (the relationships between the sentence constituents and 
the relationship between the sentence and what precedes it) and by the 
situational context (extra-linguistic factors pertaining to the discourse 
situation): these together construe different reference points which steer the 
term’s meaning.  
3.1.2. Primitive meaning attractors (prototypes, personal attractors and 
discourse situations) 
The terms we use are caught up in the representation depth that we 
mentioned earlier where extremely diverse relational networks are woven 
and which vary according to the cultures and individuals, as they are bearers 
of an individual’s experiences, both material and psychological. However, 
this representation depth affecting words is crossed by different reference-
concentrating areas, landmarks or anchoring points, which serve as 
“interpretative attractors” or “meaning attractors”, i.e. elements which 
attract/steer a term’s interpretation in a particular direction. The prototype is 
one such element.  
 
Individuals also have their own meaning attractors: out of context, a linguist 
will tend to interpret the word instrumental in its grammatical meaning (that 
of a morpheme serving to indicate that the complement corresponds to the 
instrument of the process) whereas for musicians, the first thing to spring to 
mind will be their violins or pianos.  
 
The discourse situation also functions as a factor specifying a term’s 
application domain and as a meaning attractor: depending on whether one is 
at a concert, in a bakery or at a Chinese restaurant, the French term baguette 
will be connected to the semantic domain construed by one’s location and 
will refer either to a conductor’s baton, to a loaf of bread or to chopsticks. 
The discourse situation therefore functions as the default “meaning 
attractor”: it calls up a reference domain that the terms used will naturally be 
connected to. The reference domain acts as the backdrop or ground against 
which the figure defined by the term’s signification will be profiled, the 
figure and ground together constituting the contextual meaning of the unit. 
The pragmatic context (i.e. the situation where the utterance is produced) 
can also lead to a variety of meanings on the grammatical level which 
overthrow the meaning of the whole sentence: in the French sentence je 
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vous coupe la tête (lit. “I am going to cut you the head”), depending on the 
situation, the personal pronoun vous (“you, for you”) has two different 
possible values (benefactive or applicative), so that the sentence as a whole 
takes on a completely different meaning: if you are at a fishmonger’s, it 
would mean “I’m going to cut the (fish’s) head for you” (benefactive), 
whereas if you are under threat from a mad man, it would mean “I’m going 
to cut off your head” (applicative). 
 
A term’s meaning is construed through interpretative mechanisms which are 
conditioned by different factors. Communication is only possible because 
the reference points of the verbal context take precedence over the rest. But 
interference between the different “meaning attractors” is always possible, 
as is shown for example by misunderstandings and puns (see e.g., Arnaud 
1997). 
3.1.3. Contextual meaning attractors: semantic isotopics 
The most important reference points for communication are those which are 
created by the verbal context, e.g. by the creation of relationships between a 
given term and the rest of the utterance, and between the utterance and those 
preceding it. The relationships between the terms of a sentence is notably 
governed by a fundamental mechanism of “semantic isotopic”13 which 
consists in linking a term’s meaning to the semantic universe of the 
preceding term to create interpretative continuity in the line of thought. 
Thus, in the absence of particular contextual indications, in the sentence the 
pilot pulled back on the stick to fly higher, the terms pilot and fly lead to 
interpreting stick as an “airplane control handler” and not as a “tree branch”. 
Through this isotopic process, concatenation draws a guiding thread through 
the depth dimension of language, which orientates the meaning of a term 
towards an interpretation congruent with the semantic field established by 
what precedes it. It thereby contributes to removing the potential 
ambiguities inherent to linguistic units due to their polysemy. I consider that 
the same principle of semantic isotopic comes into play in the 
disambiguization process evoked by Paprotté (1998: 248) concerning the 
two meanings of port in English: “safe harbor” or “red wine”. Thus two 
different isotopics are created in the following two examples (Figure 5): 
 
The violent hurricane did not damage the ships which where in the port 
          ⎮            ⎮         ⎮ 
isotopic1:    sea world  Æ           sea world        Æ    harbor 
 
 
                                                 
13 The concept is from Greimas (1966: 96). It was further elaborated by diverse linguists. 
For a detailed analysis of the different types of isotopics, see Rastier (1987: 87-141) for 
example.  
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Deceived by the identical color, the host took a bottle of Barolo instead of one of port 
                ⎮               ⎮               ⎮ 
isotopic2:             color        Æ            beverage            Æ            wine 
 
Figure 5: Two different isotopics for port 
 
This disambiguization process which draws a guiding thread through the 
depth dimension of language can be schematized as in Figure 6: 
 
            •    •    • 
language depth          •    •    •  isotopic 
             •    •    • 
      
utterance                              
 
 Figure 6: Semantic isotopic and language depth 
 
Setting up contextual relations creates interpretative landmarks and 
semantic fields which, apart from specific psychological situations which 
lead to the interference of personal attractors (preoccupation, fatigue, 
obsession), prevail over the other meaning landmarks and attractors.  
3.2. Contextual linkage and multiple landmarks 
The meaning of a word in context is the result of a multifactor process. In 
effect, all of the factors, contextual, lexical and grammatical, constantly 
intervene in the progressive construal of an utterance’s meaning and in the 
specification of the values of its terms. When it appears in a sentence, a unit 
is linked, concomitantly, to elements at different levels: in relation to the 
verbal context and preceding situation, in relation to the other lexical 
elements, in relation to the syntactic structures. Everything is linked in 
language and the relational mechanisms produce meaning through constant 
interaction between the elements involved. Putting words into sentences 
thereby activates one or another of its latent meanings and produces a 
contextual linkage (it clears a pathway through the forest of meanings). In 
the following sections we will first present the different linguistic 
components interacting at the utterance level in order to specify the meaning 
of a word (3.2.1., 3.2.2. and 3.2.3.), we will then mention some of the main 
mechanisms characterizing these interactions (3.2.4.).  
3.2.1. Lexical interactions 
Linking a term to various elements (the context, linguistic units and 
structures) does not constitute a simple filter among a unit’s possible values 
(as in the example cited for pit), it produces a veritable working over of the 
term’s meaning, which is construed by interactions. Thus in a floury hand 
and a floury pear, the adjective always refers to the fact that the object in 
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question at a certain point in time presents certain qualities linked to flour 
(which is its meaning), but its meaning varies considerably as it designates 
in one case an object covered with flour and in the other, the texture of flour 
(Corbin and Temple, 1994). However, this specification of the value floury 
is not foreseeable outside of the connection of the adjective to the particular 
nouns it determines. Similarly, it is the specific values of steak and man that 
will inform the variable values of the adjective tender in a tender steak or a 
tender man, while at the same time tender will specify the steak or man in 
question. We also saw that the shift in the meaning of square in a square 
person or a square foot is brought about by the interaction between the 
nominal referent’s properties and those of the determinant. Moreover, in 
some cases the precise meaning of a word or phrase is determined more by 
the verbal environment than by the parameters of the lexical entry, as in the 
case of white in white wine (cf. supra 3.1.), which is what Sinclair (1998: 6) 
calls a “semantic reversal”. From a linguistic point of view, these semantic 
shifts can be at least partly predicted by a corpus-based analysis of the 
word’s collocations (cf. Sinclair 1998, Deignan 2006). 
3.2.2. The framing role of the verbal context 
Thus the simple linking together of two notions produces an effect on their 
semantic values, due to their respective properties. In the examples we have 
looked at, the term which triggered the variation and meaning specification 
of the adjective was identifiable and located in the immediate vicinity since 
it involved a noun determined by the adjective. But there is not always a 
one-to-one correspondence between the elements which interact and it is not 
always one unit which acts upon another unit. In effect, a preceding 
utterance (no longer simply a preceding unit) can orient the value of a 
following term or utterance: the meaning of setting in I’m going to change 
the setting will vary according to whether it follows the sentence your ring 
looks very old-fashioned or this scenery doesn’t seem quite right for 
Shakespeare. Similarly, the verbal context can largely constrain the value of 
a unit or a whole phrase. Thus the whole meaning of he laid the table will 
vary according to whether one is talking about a child or a woodworker. 
Even if the terms “child” or “woodworker” were not explicitly mentioned in 
the context, the context nonetheless functions as a thematic landmark. 
3.2.3. Interactions between syntax and semantics 
Grammatical factors also affect terms’ values. To mention only a few 
examples, in French word order plays a role in specifying the meanings of 
units, as can be seen in the opposition between un homme grand “a tall 
man” (physical value of the adjective) and un grand homme “a great man” 
(appreciative value of the adjective), the place of the adjective thus plays a 
semantic role in French which constrains its behavior (shown by the fact 
that *la verte herbe lit. “the grass green” is impossible, the adjective can 
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only follow the noun as in l’herbe verte whereas English shows the exact 
reverse) and produces meaning shifts: because of the adjective’s location, in 
un bel imbécile (“a great fool”), bel does not designate a physical quality but 
serves as an intensifier for imbécile (as in English, where to obtain a 
positive reading for great, it would have to follow the noun: this fool is 
great). Similarly, the plural can also produce semantic linkage. Thus in 
English the word term has numerous possible meanings: it can designate a 
“word” (as in the expression a technical term) or an “end” (as in to put a 
term to one’s life), it can also refer to an expected end, a qualitative meaning 
(to be born at term) (cf. Robert 1999). The simple use of the plural, terms, 
produces semantic effects as it implies fragmentation which renders the 
word countable, and thus leads to its taking on the meaning “relations” as in 
to be on good terms with someone, or “conditions”: the terms of the 
contract. As terms referring to a quality are not fragmentable (cf. 
*whitishes), the plural thus eliminates the qualitative interpretation of term.  
 
In general, lexical and grammatical factors interact and mutually condition 
each other. For a construction <verb + to + complement>, the nature of the 
introductory verb constrains the choice and the grammatical category of the 
complement: take to sub-selects an activity, whereas go to sub-selects a 
place. The semantics of the verb thus limits the choice of complement by 
creating both syntactic constraints (for take to to be able to select an entity 
as complement, the preposition could not directly follow the verb, as that 
position would be occupied by the beneficiary; (He took John to the zoo vs. 
He took to swimming in the morning) as well as “semantic isotopics”. 
However, as these examples show, the lexical semantics (the value of the 
introductory verb) also specifies the semantic value of the syntactic 
construction (value of the complement introduced by to). These interactions 
between semantics and grammar are also visible in the syntax of metaphors, 
as shown by Deignan (2006) through analysis of a large corpus. For instance 
in Spanish (Balbachan 2006), the metaphorical expression matar el tiempo 
(lit. “killing time”) implies both a selectional constraint violation and a 
syntactic anomaly (the absence of the preposition ‘a’). In French, depending 
on whether they are used metaphorically or not, the following movement 
verbs have different syntactic constructions, with different prepositions: one 
says courir vers la maison “run towards the house” but à la victoire “(run) 
to victory”, nager en piscine “swim in a pool” mais dans le bonheur. lit. 
“(swim) in(to) happiness”. As shown by Yaguello (1998: 98-106), figurative 
expressions have their own syntax: although in French one can say elle a 
l’oreille fine (lit. “she has a fine ear”, meaning “she hears well”) or elle a le 
coeur gros (lit. “she has a big heart”, meaning “she is sad”), the 
constructions son oreille est fine (lit. “her ear is thin”) or son coeur est gros 
(lit. “her heart is big”) are impossible with a figurative reading, whereas 
they are acceptable if the terms are taken literally: son oreille est fine (“her 
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ear is thin”) which is constructed, and interpreted, in the same way as ses 
yeux sont bleus (“her eyes are blue”). What is at play here is that in the 
figurative sense, it is not the body part which presents the predicated 
property, but rather the quality associated with it, hearing for ear or feelings 
for the heart. However, body parts, as we mentioned above, belong to the 
category of inalienable possessions having specific syntactic properties 
which are not found in the metaphorical or metonymical uses of body parts 
in French (cf. je me suis lavé les mains / j’ai lavé ma voiture). Similarly, 
whereas by metonymy one may say in French il a la gâchette facile (lit. “he 
has an easy trigger”, meaning “he is trigger-happy”), one cannot really say 
*sa gâchette est facile (lit. “his trigger is easy”). Thus the figure leaves a 
trace in the syntactic constraints. More generally, the corpus-based analysis 
of Hunston & Francis (2000) and Deignan (2006) have shown an interesting 
point for the disambiguization of polysemy: the different meanings of 
polysemous words have a tendency to be realized in distinctive grammatical 
patterns. 
 
Let us note that the interaction between syntax and semantics can happen 
retroactively. In French, pied-de-biche rouillé (lit. “foot-of-doe rusted” 
meaning “rusty crowbar”), the (postponed) adjective retroactively converts 
the preceding expression from a genitive construction into a compound 
noun referring to a tool. 
 
Thus the factors that determine the meaning of a term vary in their nature. 
They can be either linguistic or pragmatic, and generally belong to an 
incidence domain which is also variable: their scope can cover a word, a 
group of words, or a whole sentence. The diversity of a term’s specifying 
factors (context, units, grammatical constructions, sentences) and their 
variable scope (incidence on the following unit or on the sentence as a 
whole) present a difficulty when one tries to model the processes of 
construing meaning in discourse. However, the different factors that specify 
a term’s meaning in discourse follow regular processes which are based 
upon a general mechanism that Culioli calls “repérage” (anchoring) (Culioli 
1982). This anchoring is most probably a fundamental cognitive 
mechanism, also at work in construing the figure and ground, topic and 
focus in language, as well as in visual perception. The anchoring process 
sets up a relationship between two terms through which one of the terms is 
taken as an anchor point for localizing (in its abstract sense) the other term. 
Thus a term is located in reference to another term which serves as its 
reference point and this relative localization of one term in reference to 
another produces new determinations. These “terms” can be of varying 
natures and dimensions: notions (through the different elements in the 
lexicon, such as a name in relation with an adjective for example), temporal 
reference points (a moment in time), or subjective ones (a subject) but also 
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topic and focus, propositions, sentences, or even a word’s prototypical 
meanings (in relation to its contextual meaning). These reference relations 
between an utterance’s terms produce contextual links, activate meaning 
attractors, create semantic isotopics and specify word meanings. 
3.2.4. Some semantic mechanisms at the utterance level 
One can characterize some of the different semantic mechanisms operating 
at the utterance level and producing semantic variations. The following list 
is, of course, not exhaustive. 
 
Profiling active zones 
As shown by Langacker (1991a: 189-201), different semantic components 
of a word can be activated, depending on the context. For instance, in the 
following two sentences, different parts of the window are activated: 
 
(1) He cleaned the window 
(2) He opened the window 
 
Because of the semantics of the verb, (1) refers more specifically to the 
glass of the window, whereas (2) draws more attention to the frame of the 
window. Therefore, two different zones of the word’s meaning are profiled 
in the different sentences, for which two different synonyms could be used. 
 
Constructions and coercion 
The grammatical context can at times cause the language-user to reinterpret 
all or parts of the semantic features of a lexeme that appears in it. This 
phenomenon has been referred to by computational and generative linguists 
as “coercion” and was mainly studied for aspectual shifts (Pustejovsky & 
Bouillon 1996, De Swart 1998). Consider a sentence like (3), taken from 
DeVelle (2003): 
 
(3) The tourist photographed the sunset until nightfall.  
 
The verb to photograph normally refers to a punctual event, as well as the 
singular object (the sunset); however, the adverbial until implies duration. 
The conflict between the two different aspectual specifications causes the 
verb to be reinterpreted as referring to an iterative process. This repetitive 
effect is absent both from verbs referring to a durative activity such as in 
The tourist watched the sunset until nightfall and in the other uses (i.e. 
without the adverbial until) of the verb to photograph. The aspectual value 
of to photograph has been coerced by the durative adverbial. 
 
In cognitive semantics, this phenomenon is considered an effect of a more 
general principle: (grammatical) constructions have meanings distinct from 
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those of words and these meanings interact with the meaning of the words 
(see Goldberg 1995).  
 
(4) As they have waved us along the raised causeway and into the 
rocky cleft... 
 
In this sentence, the particular interpretation of the predicate as “to signal 
permission to move to a place by waving” is produced by the so-called 
“caused-motion” construction applied to the verb to wave. 
 
Michaelis (2003) considers that there is a general override principle stating 
that “if lexical and structural meaning conflict, the semantic specifications 
of the lexical element conform to those of the grammatical structure with 
which that lexical item is combined”. This principle is illustrated by the 
interpretation of a sentence like They have good soups there. The nominal 
construction which licences the combination of a noun and a plural suffix –s 
requires that its nominal head denote a count entity. While soup, as a liquid, 
is prototypically viewed as a mass, the noun soup, when combined with the 
plural construction as here, receives the individual construal associated with 




More generally, Talmy (2000 vol.2: 324) indicates that “when the 
specifications of two forms in a sentence are in conflict, one kind of 
reconciliation is for the specification of one of the forms to change so as to 
come into accord with the other form. This change of accommodation is 
termed a shift.” Talmy (ibid. 324-336) distinguishes different types of shifts 
and also various other processes for resolving semantic conflicts (blends, 
juxtapositions, schema juggling). I would like to mention just one example 
of semantic shift which enabled me to represent the connections at work 
between the linear axis of the sentence and the depth dimension of language 
(Robert 2003). 
 
When Balzac describes Eugenie Grandet as a poor rich heiress (une riche et 
pauvre héritière), the reader reinterprets the two contradictory adjectives 
either by displacing the contradiction temporally (she is potentially rich as a 
future heiress but is currently poor), or by giving poor a subjective reading 
(“unhappy”) instead of an objective one (“who isn’t rich”), i.e. by displacing 
the adjective’s meaning onto the modal plane. The reader thus carries out a 
change in the reference point which shifts the meaning of the adjective from 
one plane onto another. This reference change makes it possible for the 
meaning to follow another path in the depth of language. This semantic 
process can be schematized as in Figure 7: 
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            •    •    • 
language depth       •    •    •   
           •    •    • 
   
utterance                        
                 shifting 
 
 Figure 7: Shift in language depth 
3.3. Semantic layering 
Because of the polysemy of words and the “depth dimension” of language, 
in some utterances it is possible to activate several meanings of the same 
word. This sort of semantic layering is the mainspring of rhetoric, puns, and 
also of advertising, as Grunig (1990) has shown, from whom the following 
examples are taken. One example is the advertisement for a brand of 
pochettes d’emballage (wrapping bags): Ces sacs qui nous emballent, 
literally “Those bags that wrap us up”, which can also figuratively mean 
“Those bags which delight us”. The advertisement thus plays on the two 
meanings of the French verb emballer, which has a literal meaning, that of 
wrapping something up, and the figurative one of delighting someone, 
similar to the slightly different English figurative meaning of wrap as in 
They’re completely wrapped up in each other. A possible English rendering 
of the advertisement would be “Wrap yourself up in these bags”. A second 
example is an advertisement for an oven which runs Mettez-lui une grosse 
tarte, which means “Put a big pie in it” but also “Give it a big slap”.  
 
These phenomena of semantic layering can cover several terms: this entails 
several isotopics being constructed within a single sentence. The following 
advertising slogan, which actually pertains to a type of car, thus plays on a 
double isotopic (see Figure 8): Quand je vois du trafic, je sors mon 
automatique, which can be almost directly translated into English by “When 
I see traffic, I take out my automatic”.  
 
  Quand je vois du trafic, je sors mon automatique 
         ⎮         ⎮ 
              contrebande               revolver 
            (“contraband”) 
    circulation            automobile 
    (“traffic”) 
 
  Figure 8: Semantic layering (activation of two isotopics 
 
Note that the two meanings are not actually activated at once: it takes time 
for the (French) reader to realize that the intended meaning (car) is not the 
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first one that came to mind (gun) (as the word trafic is not usually applied to 
driving conditions, contrary to English). In advertisements, the illustration 
often triggers the activation of the second meaning as is the case in this 
example. The second isotopic is certainly the least probable as the meaning 
of trafic for “too many cars” remains marginal in French, just as the 
nominalization of the adjective automatique (again, contrary to English), but 
this isotopic is activated by the illustration that accompanies the 
advertisement: the association between the universes of the two isotopics is 
probably not without psychological effects. Thus the two paths activated in 
the depth of language interact (Figure 9): 
 
            •   •    • 
language depth       •   •    •  isotopic 1 
            •   •    •  isotopic 2 
   
utterance             
 
 Figure 9: Activation of two paths in the language depth 
 
Another kind of semantic layering is produced by replacing a word in a set 
expression such as a proverb, the title of a movie or a famous song. One 
example is the advertisement for a cigarette brand called Kool: Some like it 
Kool which is a play on the title of the film Some like it hot. Another 
example is the advertisement for “Dim” hosiery: en avril ne te découvre pas 
d'un Dim, based on an alliterative French proverb warning against the 
sudden return of cold weather in springtime, en avril ne te découvre pas 
d'un fil “in April, don't remove a stitch (of clothing)”. The insertion of a 
single term (Kool or Dim) in the utterance activates two utterances, the 
actual slogan and the backgrounded proverb, thereby creating layers of 
meaning with semantic interaction between the two utterances.  
 
Thus we can see that the end of the utterance is the privileged location for 
what I call “semantic bombs” whose effects are not additional as they 
induce phenomena of meaning restructuring, resonance, diffusion and 
layering: on the different non linear meaning factors, one may consult 
Robert (1999 and 2003). 
Conclusion 
Because of the absence of one-to-one relations between forms and meanings 
in language, linguistic units are by nature polysemous; furthermore they are 
caught up in a fabric of various associations (the language depth) and serve 
as representation triggers; lastly, linguistic units are semantically 
deformable: when they are inserted in an utterance, the verbal and 
situational contexts act upon their meaning. This plasticity of meaning in 
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words makes for a functional optimality of linguistic systems by conferring 
upon them remarkable referential power and adaptability. It probably also 
plays a role of cognitive optimization through memory storing economy. 
This deformability of linguistic units comes nonetheless with an important 
drawback for communication as it generates ambiguities, sources of 
misunderstandings. It is then through the progressive construal of meaning 
over the whole utterance that the meanings of terms are stabilized, through 
relation processes which constantly intervene during discourse. But this 
meaning stabilization makes use of a construction dynamic and 
interpretative adjustments whose results are never guaranteed. Which shows 
that language is the seat of opposing forces which confer a particular power 
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